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I. INTRODUCTION A. Collusion Attacks on Watermarking

F
ORENSIC watermarking is a means for tracing the origin and distribution of digital content. Before distribution, the content is modified by embedding an imperceptible watermark, which plays the role of a personalized serial number. Once an unauthorized copy of the content is found, the identities of those users who participated in its creation can be determined. A tracing algorithm outputs a list of suspicious users.
The most powerful attacks against watermarking are collusion attacks [1] , in which multiple attackers (the 'coalition') combine their differently watermarked versions of the same content; the observed differences point to the locations of the hidden marks.
In the past two decades several types of collusion-resistant codes have been developed. The most popular type in the recent literature is the class of bias-based codes. These were introduced by G. Tardos in 2003. The original paper [2] was followed by a flurry of activity, e.g. improved analyses [3] - [8] , code modifications [9] - [11] , decoder modifications [12] - [14] and various generalizations [15] - [18] . The advantage of bias-based versus deterministic codes is that they can achieve the asymptotically optimal relationship ∝ c 2 between the sufficient code length and the coalition size c.
Two kinds of tracing algorithm can be distinguished: (i) simple decoders [14] , [16] , [19] , which assign a level of suspicion to single users and (ii) joint decoders [12] , [13] , [20] , which look at sets of users. Joint decoders employ a simple decoder as a bootstrapping step.
Tardos' scheme worked with a binary code and a simple decoder. Its 'suspicion function' for computing a level of suspicion for single users was improved [16] and the scheme was generalized to q-ary alphabets. However, it turns out [21] that the suspicion function yields sub-optimal fingerprinting rates, i.e. rather far below the fingerprinting capacity [22] , [23] and far below the best achieved dynamic code rate [24] .
Alternative suspicion functions for the binary case were introduced [13] , where an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm was used. A candidate coalition is selected, which (if the guess is sufficiently good) makes it possible to estimate the employed attack strategy; a suspicion function is then used which is optimized against that strategy. This leads to a new ranking of users, giving a new candidate coalition, and the whole process is repeated until it converges.
B. Contributions
This paper is an extended version of earlier work on optimal suspicion functions [25] . The current work analyzes the worst attack against the interleaving defense. It turns out that there is no stronger attack than the interleaving attack. This implies that the interleaving defense actually achieves capacity asymptotically. The current version also includes all proofs.
• We generalize the work of Charpentier et al. [13] to q-ary alphabets. Using functional derivation methods we obtain suspicion functions that for large c maximize the expected score for the coalition. We present results for the Combined-Digit Model and the Restricted-Digit Model.
• We consider a set of often-considered attack strategies.
We substitute these attacks into the generic formulas and obtain closed-form expressions for the asymptotically optimal suspicion functions associated with these attacks.
• We tabulate the performance for each combination of attack and suspicion function. For some cases we prove theorems analytically and for all binary cases we have 0018-9448 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
numerical results. Naturally, in case of a match the sufficient code length is small; for all considered strategies but the interleaving attack we even find ∝ c 3/2 . For the interleaving attack and its matching suspicion function we find an asymptotic fingerprinting rate (q − 1)/(2c 2 ln q), which is exactly the q-ary asymptotic fingerprinting capacity. In non-matching cases the results differ widely. In some cases, as expected, the mismatched defense fails completely, while in others the code length remains ∝ c 2 (often with a smaller coefficient than with the Tardos suspicion function), and in many cases we find ∝ c 3/2 even for a mismatch.
• The suspicion function tailored against the interleaving attack is very special. When this suspicion function is adopted as the basis of a simple decoder, the minimax game for the asymptotic code rate (attack strategy versus bias distribution function) has a saddle point when the interleaving attack is used and the distribution function is the Dirichlet distribution with concentration parameter 1/2. In the saddle point the asymptotic rate equals the asymptotic capacity. The saddle point is the same point that was found by Huang and Moulin [23] for the mutual information minimax game. Thus, we have identified a simple decoder that asymptotically achieves capacity. In Sections III-A and XI we comment on possible ways to exploit our results for the construction of improved decoders by using several suspicion functions in parallel, and/or deploying a tally-dependent suspicion to strengthen the EM algorithm, and/or to validate candidate coalitions in general.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. General Notation
We denote random variables by capital letters and their realizations in lower case. We write vectors in boldface. We define [ ] = {1, . . . , }. The q-ary alphabet is A, which is sometimes set to A = {0, . . . , q − 1}.
We use multi-index notation, e.g.
We define the norm of a vector as | p| = α∈A | p α |. For probability mass/density functions we use abbreviated notation of the form f y| p = f Y | P (y| p) when it does not cause ambiguity.
In conditional expectation values we sometimes use the abbreviation
. An E without subscripts is an expectation over all probabilistic degrees of freedom. We use δ x,y to denote the Kronecker delta function, which is 1 when x = y and 0 when x = y.
The notation
| | p|=1 is defined as follows. First the derivative ∂ A/∂ p x is taken without taking the constraint α p α = 1 into account. After differentiation the constraint is enforced.
We will use the shorthand notation a k := ( p 0 + · · · + p k−1 ) and a B = β∈B p β .
B. Bias-Based Tracing; Simple Decoder
The content contains abstract 'locations' into which a q-ary symbol can be embedded. For each location i ∈ [ ] independently, the tracer draws a bias vector P i = (P i,α ) α∈A from a distribution f P . The biases satisfy P i,α ≥ 0 and | P i | = 1. A symmetric Dirichlet distribution was taken [16] , with concentration parameter κ > 0,
For q = 2 it is customary to set κ = 1 2 , turning (1) into the arcsine distribution for the component p 1 . However, in that case the support has to be reduced to p 1 ∈ [δ, 1 − δ], with cutoff parameter δ > 0, in order to avoid statistical problems due to extremely unlikely events. The probability density function then becomes
As the cutoff parameter is typically chosen so small that it vanishes, we will neglect it in our analysis. The number of users is n. For each i ∈ [ ] and each j ∈ [n], the tracer draws a random symbol X i, j ∈ A according to the categorical distribution with parameter
The symbol X i, j is embedded into the content of user j in location i . The coalition of attackers is denoted as C ⊂ [n], with |C| = c. In some attack models, e.g. the Combined-Digit Model (Section II-C), they are allowed to do signal processing attacks such as introducing noise and fusing symbols. In the Restricted-Digit Model (RDM) they are only allowed to select one colluder's symbol (denoted as y i ) in location i . In the simple decoder approach, the tracer determines a score S j for each user j by adding independently computed sub-scores S i, j for each location i ; these are based on p i , X i, j and the colluders' output in location i . If the score exceeds a threshold, user j is accused.
Tardos [2] introduced a (simple decoder) score system for the RDM at q = 2 that was later [16] symmetrized and generalized to q > 2. The sub-scores for each location are computed using a 'suspicion function' g as
It has the special property that the S i, j of innocent users has expectation 0 and variance 1.
Given the symmetries present in the code generation and accusation algorithm, it is usually assumed that the attackers apply a strategy that acts at every location independently. Furthermore, we assume that the colluders take equal risks.
In such an attack model, the colluders' decision in location i depends only on the tallies M i,α = |{ j ∈ C|X i, j = α}| (with α ∈ A). The tallies satisfy |M i | = c, and they are multinomial-distributed, with density f m| p = c m p m . The attack strategy may be probabilistic.
C. Combined-Digit Model (CDM)
The CDM [17] allows colluders to mix symbols and to introduce noise (see Figure 1) . In each location, the symbols that are mixed are assumed to have equal power. The set of symbols that the colluders choose to mix is denoted as ⊆ A with m α > 0 for each α ∈ . The attack strategy is parametrized by a set of probabilities f ψ |m . The tracer has a detector that outputs a set ⊆ A of observed symbols. The joint effects of the noise and the mixing lead to probability distributions f | , where it is possible that the noise introduces symbols in that are absent in . Simple-decoder score systems were introduced in [17] and [18] .
The CDM reduces to the RDM when the noise strength is sent to zero and the detector unerringly observes = , forcing the colluders to output a single symbol, = {Y }. For the RDM, a strategy is parametrized by a set of probabilities f y|m .
D. Performance; Moments of the Scores
The performance of bias-based tracing schemes can for a large part be characterized by looking merely at the first and second moment of the innocent and guilty scores. (This holds especially at large c, where the large code length induces an almost-Gaussian shape of the score probability distributions.)
For an innocent user j , we define the mean and variance as
where the index i ∈ [ ] is arbitrary. The expectation E is taken over the random variables P i , X i, j , and Y i (in the CDM i and i instead of Y i ). We call a suspicion function centered if it yieldsμ inn = 0 and normalized ifσ 2 inn = 1. For the coalition we define S i,C := j ∈C S i, j . The moments arẽ
again with arbitrary index i . The limit c → ∞ (and correspondingly n → ∞) is of particular interest, since it lends itself to analysis. The term 'asymptotically' will refer to this limit.
Due to the Central Limit Theorem, the probability distribution of the innocent users' score is asymptotically Gaussian. For Gaussian distributions it was shown [8] , [16] that the sufficient code length suff is given by
where ε 1 is the maximum tolerated false accusation probability for any fixed innocent user. (Note that 1/ε 1 is proportional to n).
The fingerprinting rate R of a code is defined as R def = log q n . The asymptotic rate that follows from (8) is
The fingerprinting capacity is the maximum achievable fingerprinting rate. For the RDM it was shown [22] that the capacity in the case of a joint decoder is given by C
. The mutual information game, in which the colluders choose an attack strategy f y|m and the tracer chooses a bias distribution f p , has a saddlepoint [23] at f y|m = m y /c (the interleaving attack), f p ∝ p −1/2 (the Dirichlet distribution with κq = 1/2). It was also shown [23] that the simple-decoder capacity asymptotically becomes equal to the joint-decoder capacity.
III. OPTIMAL SUSPICION FUNCTIONS
We consider suspicion functions h other than the function g given in (3). We derive suspicion functions that maximize the performance indicatorμ C /σ inn , in the CDM as well as the RDM. Without loss of generality, we will consider only suspicion functions that are centered (μ inn = 0) and normalized (σ inn = 1). We use the standard approach of Lagrange functionals; we use constraint multipliers λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ R to enforce the constraintsμ inn = 0 andσ inn = 1. We define the functional
whereμ inn ,σ inn andμ C depend on the function h as specified in (4) (5) (6) . The optimal h is found by solving the set of equations δL/δh = 0, ∂ L/∂λ 1 = 0 and ∂ L/∂λ 2 = 0. The solution depends on the arguments of h: in the CDM the sub-score of user j in location i is typically a function of X i, j , i and P i ; in the RDM a function of X i, j , Y i and P i .
A. Optimal Suspicion Functions in the Combined-Digit Model
We present a number of lemmas leading up to the main theorem of this section, which shows the solution obtained by the Lagrangian approach. The conditional probabilities that appear in the lemmas are related as follows:
The numbers f φ|ψ are fixed parameters of the CDM independent of the strategy.
Lemma 1: An optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, φ, ψ, p) does not depend on φ. An optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, φ, ψ, m, p) depends neither on φ nor ψ.
Proof Sketch: The set ψ contains more information about the attackers than the set φ. Likewise, the tallies m contain more information than ψ.
We will give the full proof after Theorem 1.
To determine the optimal suspicion functions of the increasingly general forms h(x, φ, p), h(x, φ, ψ, p), and h(x, φ, ψ, m, p), it suffices to study the forms h (x, φ, p), h (x, ψ, p), and h M (x, m, p), respectively.
Lemma 2: Let h be of the form h (x, φ, p) and define
Proof: We write (6) as 
and the expected coalition score isμ
with the two Lagrange multipliers λ 1 and λ 2 enforcing that the function is centered and normalized respectively. Let h be such that
where D is the product of the probability densities of the random variables),
. The first constraint,μ inn = 0, implies that
From the previous lemmas, we conclude that
Now that we have seen the proof technique for Theorem 1, we can state the full proof of Lemma 1:
Proof of Lemma 1: To determine the optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, ψ, p) in the proof of Theorem 1 we defined the Lagrangian
Instead, to determine the optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, φ, ψ, p), we would define the same Lagrangian, but now with E[.
We obtain the same Euler-Lagrange equation but now with
In both cases, we draw the same conclusion: that cT − λ 1 − λ 2 h = 0. We therefore find that the optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, φ, ψ, p) is the one we found in Lemma 3 of the form h(x, ψ, p).
Likewise, the optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, φ, ψ, m, p) is the one we found in Lemma 4 of the form h(x, m, p).
Our suspicion functions have a close relation with Neyman-Pearson scores, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: In all three cases T
and thus T is a Neyman-Pearson score. Proof: The Neyman-Pearson score for testing a hypothesis H given evidence e is given by the likelihood ratio P[e|H = True]/P[e|H = False]. Our hypothesis is H = ( j ∈ C) for a user j ∈ [n], and we consider the evidence e = (x, φ, p) available in one location. (The proof for all the other cases is analogous.) Then the Neyman-Pearson score is
Here e x is a length q vector containing a 1 in position x and zero elsewhere. Several things are worth noting about these results.
(i) In the proof of Theorem 1 it is not necessary to specify the bias distribution. Thoughμ C is a functional of both h and f P , the optimization of h does not depend on f P . (ii) In all three cases the result for h depends on information that the tracer usually does not have. (The strategy f ψ|m in Lemmas 2 and 3; the tallies m in Lemma 4). When a function h , for some guessed strategy, is used to compute scores, there is no guarantee that the attackers are actually adhering to that guessed strategy. Such 'mismatched' situations will be discussed (for the RDM) in the remainder of this paper. (iii) We can think of two ways in which the m-dependent
, can be used in practice. First, it could be employed in the EM algorithm [13] . The EM procedure estimates a strategy based on the symbols received by the candidate coalition, and then uses this estimate to adapt the suspicion function. Our h function could be used to directly assign scores to all users, skipping the strategy estimation step. This would speed up each iteration of the EM algorithm and avoid the statistical inaccuracies in the estimation. (Of course, inaccuracies due to a wrongly guessed coalition remain, and may even increase.) Secondly, this h function can be used as a consistency check in the following way. Suppose that, by some means, a candidate coalitionĈ has been tentatively identified. Then one computes a score (
all users, where the tally m x is based onĈ and the user's symbol x. IfĈ equals the actual coalition, one should see a huge score difference between innocent users and the colluders. Exploration of these ideas is left for future work.
(iv) The expression ∂ ln f /∂ p x in all three cases has the form of a Fisher score, being the derivative of the logarithm of a conditional probability with respect to the conditioning variable. We suspect that this form is no coincidence. However, the intuitive meaning of the associated 'game' (guessing p from y) is not immediately obvious. Asymptotically m tends to cp. We hypothesize that the game 'guess p from y' is asymptotically equivalent to 'guess m from y'. The latter is a known formulation of the tracing problem. (v) Our result in Proposition 1 is different from the Neyman-Pearson score in [14] and [20] , where the whole sequence (Y i ) i∈[ ] was considered.
B. Optimal Suspicion Functions in the Restricted-Digit Model
The Restricted-Digit Model is a special case of the Combined-Digit Model.
Corollary 1: Let h be of the form h Y (x, y, p) and define
(40)
The optimal h function in the RDM case follows straightforwardly from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 by taking the limit of zero noise and perfect detection of all mixed symbols, leading to = = {Y }, with Y ∈ A.
In the RDM, Lemma 4 and Theorem 1 hold without change. Note that the Marking Assumption is not invoked to obtain Corollary 1. Hence Corollary 1 is valid in a more general setting, as long as the colluders produce a single symbol which is unerringly detected by the tracer.
Note also that (40) with q = 2 matches the expression given by Charpentier et al. [13] (which only considered the binary case).
C. Strongly Centered and Normalized Suspicion Functions
In (10) we required our optimal score functions to be centered and normalized. The normalization was done without loss of generality, since scores can be rescaled arbitrarily. The symmetric Tardos suspicion function was chosen to satisfy stronger properties: it is both centered and normalized, no matter what the pirate symbol y or the bias vector p are (and no matter what the attack strategy or the bias distribution is for that matter). These properties are captured in the following definition.
We call a suspicion function h(x, y, p) strongly
We show that even when the score function does not match the pirate strategy, the optimal score functions derived in the previous section remain centered but not necessarily normalized.
Lemma 5: Each optimal suspicion function (see Theorem 1) is strongly centered. So is the symmetric Tardos function.
Proof: This follows directly from (16). If we wanted to find optimal suspicion functions that are both strongly centered and strongly normalized, like the symmetric Tardos suspicion function, in (10) we should require
Since our optimal suspicion functions already turned out to be strongly centered, in Theorem 1 only the normalizing constant changes:
Corollary 2: The strongly centered and strongly normalized suspicion function that maximizesμ C is
with the two Lagrange multipliers λ 1 and λ 2 enforcing that the function is strongly centered and strongly normalized respectively. Let h be such that
and the second constraint that h(x, y, p) is strongly normalized implies that
D. Building a Traitor Tracing Scheme
Now that we have described our new optimal suspicion function, there is one caveat left to address. As noted before, when a suspicion function h, for some guessed strategy, is used to compute scores, there is no guarantee that the attackers are actually adhering to that guessed strategy. In particular, this means that we no longer have the propertyσ 2 inn = 1 which the Tardos suspicion function enjoys.
As a result, we can not simply plug our suspicion function into the Tardos traitor tracing scheme, since such a scheme typically accuses a user when he exceeds a fixed threshold. Traditionally, the use of a fixed threshold is possible since the scaling of the scores is taken care of by the propertỹ σ 2 inn = 1. Thus, ideally, we would like to have a normalized suspicion function. This can be achieved by scaling all scores (i.e. scaling the function h) by a factorσ inn . Since at this point both the bias vector p and the collusion symbols y have been determined, we can calculate the sample variance. Thus if we scale all scores by a factorσ by replacing them with S j /σ for every user j , the traitor tracing scheme will perform well against any collusion strategy.
IV. DEFENDING AGAINST COMMON COLLUSION STRATEGIES
From this point onward, we consider only the RDM. For a number of often-studied strategies we compute the optimal suspicion function. We investigate the situation where the actual attack is indeed the one for which the h-function was designed (a "match"), as well as mismatches. We will call the "optimal suspicion function against strategy A" the A-defense. The following sections will focus on defenses against five often-considered strategies. In short, these strategies can be described as follows:
1) Interleaving Attack (Section V): The interleaving attack randomly selects an attacker and outputs his symbol. 2) All-High (All-1) Attack (Section VI): The all-high attack is special as it breaks the symbol symmetry. It assumes that the alphabet can be ordered in some meaningful way, and outputs the largest received symbol. In the binary case q = 2 this attack is known as the all-1 attack, as it will output a 1 if the coalition has received one.
The random-symbol attack randomly selects a received symbol, irrespective of the tally vector m, and outputs it.
In the binary case q = 2 this attack is known as the coin-flip attack.
4) Majority Voting Attack (Section VIII):
The majority voting attack outputs the symbol that was received most often by the coalition. In case multiple symbols are received equally often, a random symbol is chosen among them. 5) Minority Voting Attack (Section IX): The minority voting attack outputs the symbol that was received least often (but at least once) by the coalition. When multiple symbols are received equally often, a random symbol is chosen among them. A detailed description of each attack will be given at the start of its section. We also dedicate a section (Section X) to analyzing the performance of the traditional symmetrized Tardos suspicion function against these attacks.
V. INTERLEAVING DEFENSE
A. Optimal Defense
The interleaving attack f y|m = m y /c randomly selects an attacker and outputs his symbol.
Proposition 2: Against the interleaving attack, the quantity T is given by T (x, y, p)
, and the optimal suspicion function is
Proof: We find
The performance of the interleaving defense against the interleaving attack is given in the following lemma.
Proposition 3: When the interleaving attack is used against the interleaving defense, thenμ C = √ q − 1, achieving capacity for any f P .
Proof: From Theorem 1 we know thatμ
. Combining this with (52) yieldsμ C = √ q − 1. We compute the asymptotic code rate according to (9) , using
, which is exactly the asymptotic fingerprinting capacity (see Section II-D). In the derivation of this result, the bias distribution f y|p was not used at any point.
Finding a suspicion function that (even asymptotically) achieves capactity is a remarkable result. In the rest of this section we will first analyze its performance against other known attack strategies. In the next Section (V-B), we will focus on its performace against generic attack strategies, and show that the interleaving defense achieves capacity against any attack strategy.
When x = y, the h is positive and increasing in p y (rare events raise more suspicion). When x = y, it is negative and constant, in contrast to (3) . The h is independent of c.
Lemma 6: If the tracer uses the interleaving defense, then, no matter what attack is used,
where T belongs to the attack. Proof: Using the interleaving defense from (45), we find
We can explicitly calculate the performance against the all-high attack (which is formalized in Proposition 10). Recall that a k := ( p 0 + · · · + p k−1 ).
Proposition 4: If the tracer uses the interleaving defense, but the coalition uses the all-high attack, theñ
, and (59)
Proof: Using Lemma 6 with (116), we find
and, with (121),
If the Dirichlet distribution is usedμ C will scale as c 1−κ for large coalitions:
Proposition 5: Let f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with cutoff δ = 0. If the tracer uses the interleaving defense, but the colluders use the all-high attack, theñ
Proof: 
Next we use the property
x, and a, b independent of x. (See [7, Lemma 7] .) This gives
The dominant term is b = q − 1, yielding (63). The smaller b values in the sum are terms of relative order 1/c or smaller.
Finally we derive the marginal distribution M(a y ).
where 1 q is a vector consisting of q ones and B is the generalized Beta function. We do the following change of integration variables: for α < y we write p α = a y t α and for α ≥ y we write p α = (1 − a y ) 
Simplification of the Beta functions gives the density M(a y ) as listed earlier in this proof. We now investigate the binary case q = 2. We can then rephrase Proposition 4 as 
Proof: Using Lemma 6 with (165), we find
and, with (169),
Note the similarity between the coin-flip attack and the all-1 attack. For the Dirichlet distribution, this can be analytically shown:
Proposition 7: Let q = 2 and f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameter κ = 
For large c these behave asμ C ∝ c 1−κ andσ 2 inn ∝ c 1−κ . Proof: In the case of the coin-flip attack we havẽ
since f P is symbol-symmetric. Also, f y| p = 
We have
y∈{0,1}
In the third line we used the fact that f P is symbol-symmetric. Re-expressing the Beta functions in terms of Gamma functions, followed by some simplification, yields
Due to the symbol symmetry of f P , the derivations for the all-1 attack are the same.
B. Does the Interleaving Defense Achieve Capacity?
The main question we ask ourselves in this section is whether the interleaving defense can be used as a generic suspicion function against all attacks. Proposition 3 shows that it asymptotically yields a rate equal to capacity in the saddle point [23] . However, we have to exclude the possibility that there is a better attack than interleaving against the interleaving defense. We do this in two steps: first we will show the existence of a saddlepoint in the attack vs. distribution space, and then we will argue that for a fixed distribution this saddle point attains the minimum value of the performance indicatorin other words, that there is no better attack.
In the first step we do a saddlepoint analysis of the performance indicatorμ C /σ inn , in the following setting. We fix the employed suspicion function h to be the 'Interleaving defense' as specified in Proposition 2. The tracer has to tune the bias distribution f p and at the same time the coalition has to find the best possible attack f y|m against the combination f p , h. This simultaneous counter-acting optimization leads to a saddle point solution forμ C /σ inn which is a minimum as a function of the attack strategy and a maximum as a function of f p . A similar analysis was done by Huang and Moulin [23] in the context of the q-ary fingerprinting capacity, abstracting away the exact suspicion function to be employed. They found the saddlepoint at (attack = interleaving, f p = Dirichlet with κ = 1 2 ), consistent with the asymptotic (c → ∞) fingerprinting capacity (q − 1)/(2c 2 ln q) known earlier [22] .
We use the Lagrangian approach, with functional L given by
Here the λ m and are constraint multipliers: λ m multiplies the constraint that, for every m, f y|m is a probability mass function for y, and multiplies the constraint that f p is a probability density function. 
Proposition 8: Let the tracer use the interleaving defense. When the interleaving attack strategy is used, and the bias distribution is the Dirichlet distribution with
The functional derivatives ofμ C andσ 2 inn are
With these ingredients, the stationarity equations become
Equation (94) has to hold for all symbols y. This means that the expression E P
has to be independent of y. This is a very complicated requirement on f p and the attack; in general there is no easy way of solving it. However, if we take the Dirichlet distribution for f p , with parameter κ, then
and it becomes possible to satisfy the independence requirement by demanding
With this special relation betweenμ C andσ 2 inn , (96) becomes
We have to find strategy parameters f y|m that give rise to a function f y| p that satisfies (99). We happen to know from (46) that the interleaving attack satisfies
Thus (99) is satisfied if we take the interleaving attack and
Next, we know thatσ 2 inn = 1 in case of a match since our suspicion function is normalized, and Proposition 3 tells us thatμ C = √ q − 1 for the interleaving match. The relationship (98) can only hold if κ = 1/2.
Thus, we have a stationary point in which the interleaving attack is used and
We have a match withμ 2 C /σ 2 inn = q − 1, which corresponds to asymptotic capacity as described in Proposition 3.
Part 2:
We take an arbitrary point in ( f y|m , f p )-space and consider the infinitesimal steps
with y ym = 0 and d q p δ(| p| − 1)β( p) = 0. In the new point we writễ
whereμ (0) =μ C andσ 2 (0) =σ 2 inn refer to values in the original point ( f y|m , f p ), and we have defined
The subscript indicates the order of the small step. The maximum order is 2, since the expressions forμ C andσ 2 inn are linear in both f p and f y|m . We investigate the fractioñ
where the dots stand for higher order terms. In the last line we did a Taylor expansion of the denominator. By collecting equal order terms in (110) we obtain the first and second order components
We take the stationary point as our starting point and first make a step in the f p -direction only, i.e. ym = 0.
The fact that ym = 0 yieldsμ (2) = 0 andσ 2 (2) = 0 from (106) and (107). Furthermore, in (104) and (105) note that the sum over y yields a constant as in (100), and then integrating β gives zero. Soμ (1) = 0 andσ 2 (1) = 0 as well. Thus we conclude that from the stationary point, changing only f p does not change the performance indicatorμ 2 C /σ 2 inn . Note that this is consistent with Proposition 3.
Secondly we fix f p to be the Dirichlet distribution with κ = 1 2 and vary the attack slightly from interleaving. Now β = 0, which yieldsμ (2) = 0 andσ 2 (2) = 0. Equation (113) with β = 0 then reduces to a square, which is non-negative. Thus the performance indicator is minimized when the interleaving attack is used, and the found stationary point is indeed a saddlepoint.
This saddlepoint leads to a global minimum: Theorem 2: Assume the tracer uses the interleaving defense and the Dirichlet distribution with κ = Proof: From Proposition 8 we know that the interleaving attack is a local minimum in this setting. Also, when the distribution is fixed as the Dirichlet distribution with κ = 1 2 , the proof of Proposition 8 states that the second derivative (113) is non-negative for any strategy, as β( p) = 0 implies that μ (2) 
is a rational function of ym , we can conclude that the interleaving attack is a global minimum for this setting.
C. Relation to the Tardos Suspicion Function
The interleaving defense is closely related to the Tardos suspicion function: . So by Theorem 2, the strongly normalized optimal suspicion function against the interleaving attack is
which equals the symmetric Tardos function (3). 
D. Interleaving Defense Numerics
To verify our analytic results and their practical applicability, we ran simulations for the binary case and the arcsine distribution (without cut-off), which is equal to the Dirichlet distribution with κ = 1 2 . We simulated the five described attacks (interleaving, all-1, coin-flip, majority voting, and minority voting) against the interleaving defense. We stress that these five attacks are by no means exhaustive.
We ran simulations for 1 ≤ c ≤ 200 to obtain theμ C and thẽ σ inn in these five cases as depicted in Fig.2 . We then analyzed this data to obtain the leading-order term in c. The results can be found in Table I . Since for mismatches the innocent score is no longer normalized (σ inn = 1), we present the results for μ C /σ inn to make a fair comparison.
As predicted by Theorem 2, the interleaving defense attains capacity (μ = 1) against the interleaving attack. We also observe that the majority voting attack has a constantμ. For the other three attacks,μ C /σ inn seems to grow as c 1/4 . We were able to prove this for the all-1 and coin-flip attacks in Proposition 7.
VI. ALL-HIGH DEFENSE
A. Optimal Defense
The all-high attack 
In case of a match, it holds that
(117) Proof: We find 
Also, 
We obtain (117) usingμ We now analyze the behaviour ofμ C when the symmetric Dirichlet distribution is employed. Before we can state our result, we will need the following Lemma:
Lemma 7: Let f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution without cutoff. The joint distribution for the pair
Proof: We first derive the joint distribution J (a y , a y+1 ) for A y and A y+1 :
Here δ(x) is the Dirac delta function. We perform the following change of variables: for i < y we define p i = a y s i ; for i > y we define
The expression (131) becomes
Finally we do a last change of variables from a y to z = a y /a y+1 . This gives da y da y+1 = a y+1 da y+1 dz, and (136) becomes
Inserting the normalization constants yields the result of the lemma. Given this joint distribution, we can now derive our main result for the all-high attack when the symmetric Dirichlet distribution is used.
Proposition 11: Let f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution without cutoff. If the attack is the all-high attack and the defense matches it, then, for large c,
where ζ is the Riemann zeta function. Proof: We write (117) as
The fraction can be expanded as
Then we evaluate the expectation using the joint distribution
) from Lemma 7. This yields
noting that 1/B(yκ, κ) vanishes for y = 0. Further simplification gives
Finally we use the identity
] to investigate the asymptotics. In the first summation over y the dominant term occurs at y = q −2, thus the summation can be simplified to
Similarly, in the second summation over y the dominant term occurs at y = q − 1 and thus this summation reduces to
, where ζ is the Riemann zeta function.
B. All-1 Defense
The binary all-high attack is known as the all-1 attack. It has f 1|m = 1 whenever m 1 > 0 and f 1|m = 0 when m 1 = 0.
Corollary 4: Against the all-1 attack, the optimal suspicion function is h
In case of a match it holds that 
When x < y, the h is positive for any c, in contrast to the q-ary case.
Corollary 5: Let f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with κ = Before we investigate the behaviour of the all-high defense against an interleaving attack, we first prove a general lemma about the interleaving attack.
Lemma 8: If the tracer uses a strongly centered score function and the coalition uses the interleaving attack, theñ
Proof: For the interleaving attack, cT = δ x,y p y
where (151) holds since
The performance of the all-high defense against the interleaving attack can be analyzed as follows:
Proposition 12: If the tracer uses the all-high defense but the coalition uses the interleaving attack, theñ
where T belongs to the all-high defense. Proof: Applying Lemma 8 we obtaiñ
In the binary case this reduces to Proposition 13: For q = 2, if the tracer uses the all-1 defense, but the coalition uses the interleaving attack, thenμ
Proof: Applying Lemma 8 we obtaiñ
The scaling behaviour for large c is Lemma 9: Let q = 2 and f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameter κ = 
For large c, this scales as c (κ+1)/2 .
C. All-1 Defense Numerics
We ran simulations for the binary case and the arcsine distribution (without cut-off) with the same parameters as described in Section V-D. The table looks very similar to that of the interleaving defense. As expected, the all-1 defense performs better against the all-1 attack, but worse against the other four attacks. However, it retains the same scaling behaviour.
We again stress that these five attacks are by no means exhaustive.
VII. RANDOM-SYMBOL DEFENSE
A. Optimal Defense
The random-symbol attack selects one of the received symbols uniformly at random. Tallies are disregarded, but a symbol can only be chosen if its tally is nonzero. The attack is parametrized by f y|m = (1 − δ m y ,0 )/|{α ∈ A : m α > 0}|. 
|B|(|B| + 1) . (158)
The optimal suspicion function is h 
Note that
and for each proper subset B A with y ∈ B, it holds that 
which simplifies to equation (158).
B. Coin-Flip Defense
The binary random-symbol attack is known as the coin-flip attack, and is parametrized as f y|m = (166) 
Thus 
Lemma 10: For q = 2, if the tracer uses the coin-flip defense, but the coalition uses the interleaving attack, theñ
(172) Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 8 with (165).
C. Coin-Flip Defense Numerics
We ran simulations for the binary case and the arcsine distribution (without cut-off) with the same parameters as described in Section V-D. The results look quite different to those of the interleaving defense. As expected, the coin-flip defense performs better against the coin-flip attack. However, against a majority voting attack this defense fails, as no information on the coalition is gained. There is still a small advantage left against an interleaving attack. However, it retains the same scaling behaviour against the minority voting and all-1 attacks.
We note that the all-1 and coin-flip attacks numerically perform the same against this defense. We could only prove this fact analytically for the interleaving defense.
VIII. MAJORITY VOTING DEFENSE
A. Optimal Defense
The majority voting attack outputs the symbol with the highest tally. In case of a tie, a uniform choice is made from 
If instead c is even, the expression receives an additional term 
B. Majority Voting Defense Numerics
We ran simulations for the binary case and the arcsine distribution (without cut-off) with the same parameters as described in Section V-D. At first glance, the results look even more promising than those from the interleaving defense. Except against the interleaving attack, the performance of the majority voting defense grows as c 0.25 against the other 4 considered attacks. However, capacity is not achieved against the interleaving attack.
We note again that the all-1 and coin-flip attacks numerically perform the same against this defense. However, we were unable to show this analytically as we could for the interleaving defense.
We again stress that these five attacks are by no means exhaustive. 
IX. MINORITY VOTING DEFENSE
A. Optimal Defense
The minority voting attack outputs the symbol with the lowest nonzero tally. In case of a tie, a uniform choice is made from the winners. For the binary case, this can be expressed as: 
B. Minority Voting Defense Numerics
We ran simulations for the binary case and the arcsine distribution (without cut-off) with the same parameters as described in Section V-D. The performance against the (targeted) minority voting attack is excellent, and in fact the best when one considers each attack against the matching defense. However, against the other four considered attacks the performance is poor: the minority voting defense fails against the interleaving and majority voting attacks, and only attains a small advantage against the all-1 and coin-flip attacks. We again see that the all-1 and coin-flip attacks numerically perform the same against this defense. However, we were unable to prove this as we could for the interleaving defense.
X. TARDOS SUSPICION FUNCTION
We end by analyzing the performance of the traditional symmetric Tardos suspicion function.
Lemma 13: If the tracer uses the symmetric Tardos suspicion function, theñ
Proof: See (3). Since, for fixed y, h(x, y, p) is the same for all x = y, we find 
Proof: When q = 2 and p 1 follows the arcsine distribution on [δ, 1 − δ] with probability density function (2) theñ
For δ = 0 we findμ C = 2 π . Since the marginal distribution of the symmetric Dirichlet distribution is the Beta distribution with parameters κ and (q − 1)κ, we find:
Now we set κ = 1 q . Using Euler's reflection formula
We see thatμ C is only a slowly increasing function of q approaching the constant value π/2, which is far from the optimal code rate.
Proposition 17: If the tracer uses the symmetric Tardos suspicion function and the coalition uses the all-high attack, thenμ
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 13 with (116) and (121).
Proposition 18: If the tracer uses the symmetric Tardos suspicion function and the coalition uses the random-symbol attack, theñ
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 13 with (158) and (160).
It is already known that in the binary case the Tardos defense has a constantμ C :
Proposition 19 [16] : Let q = 2 and f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameter κ = 
XI. DISCUSSION
We have investigated the optimization of the performance indicatorμ C /σ inn for bias-based traitor tracing in the simpledecoder setting. A straightforward Lagrangian approach yields a simple expression (Theorem 1) for the optimal suspicion function in a wide variety of contexts, e.g. CDM and RDM, binary and q-ary. The result is a Neyman-Pearson score for the hypothesis j ∈ C based on single-location information. It also has the form of a Fisher score, though without a fully understood interpretation.
The h function we obtain with the Lagrangian method depends either on the collusion strategy or on the coalition's symbol tallies m. These quantities are usually unknown to the tracer. Our optimization approach does not allow for deriving suspicion functions that are based purely on data known to the tracer.
In Section III-A we speculated on the use of the m-dependent suspicion function in the EM algorithm or as a consistency check for candidate coalitions. Further exploration is left for future work.
For several binary and q-ary attacks in the RDM we have derived the optimal suspicion function. We have investigated the performance indicatorμ C /σ inn in many combinations of suspicion function and attack strategy. In some cases analytic results are obtained. Notably, the matching case of the q-ary interleaving attack givesμ C /σ inn =μ C = √ q − 1, asymptotically (c → ∞) yielding a code rate precisely equal to the channel capacity [22] .
For q = 2 the numerical results for the performance indicatorμ C /σ inn are summarized in Table VI . We observe Fig. 7 . Performance of optimal suspicion functions against the corresponding attack in the binary case. that the interleaving defense, all-1 defense and majority voting defense outperform the Tardos suspicion function for all the considered attacks. In many cases even a positive power of c occurs instead of a constant value:μ C /σ inn ∝ c 0 changes to c 1/4 . This is a huge reduction as it leads to a codelength of ∝ c 3/2 . Figure 7 depicts the performance of the optimal defenses against the correspending attacks. This figure shows that the interleaving attack is particularly strong, as it is the only one with a constant value ofμ C . The other attacks all seem to scale as c 1/4 , with minority voting being the attack easiest to defend against. Figure 8 shows the performance of the interleaving defense against the five considered attacks.
Another intriguing pattern from the numerical data is the similarity of the all-1 and coin-flip attacks. Except against the all-1 defense, they have the exact same numerical results. Even though for the all-1 attack against the coin-flip defensẽ σ inn = 1, the normalizedμ C /σ inn values are again the same.
We have proven this against the interleaving defense in Proposition 7. This similarity can be explained by realizing that after the collusion attack is performed, the tracer can flip all symbols in the locations where the coalition produced a 0. This transforms the coin-flip attack into the all-1 attack, with the caveat that the coalition then never can receive the 0 vector. Naturally, this does NOT apply to the all-1 defense, as this score function is not symbol-symmetric.
It is dangerous to draw general conclusions from the table, however, since not all possible attacks are listed.
Proposition 8 and Theorem 2 on the other hand represent a very important general large-c result: the point (interleaving attack, Dirichlet bias distribution with κ = 1/2) is a saddlepoint of theμ C /σ inn minimax game when the interleaving defense is used. With the interleaving defense as the simple decoder, the attackers cannot mount a stronger attack than the interleaving attack, and even then they cannot push the rate below the capacity.
With perfect hindsight, this result should not surprise us too much. It was shown by Huang and Moulin [23] that, in the large-c limit, the joint-decoder capacity and simpledecoder capacity coincide. Thus, asymptotically, an optimal simple decoder should automatically achieve capacity.
We now might simply decide to completely switch to the interleaving defense and abandon all other simple decoders. However, the results of Sections IV-X suggest that the other defenses can be used advantageously in a practical decoder scheme at non-asymptotic c. We envisage a decoder that runs the interleaving defense and a small battery of our h functions in parallel (one for every known 'basic' strategy, e.g. the ones discussed in this paper). Whenever the colluders use one of the basic strategies, the associated h function will quickly distinguish them from the innocent users; for other strategies, the interleaving defense does the job. The challenge is to combine the different score systems into an effective decoder. Here it has to be borne in mind that both the computational load and the total false positive probability grow with the number of incorporated h functions.
Future work will focus on (a) investigating which (if any) cutoff to use in a practical traitor tracing scheme, as we expect its scaling behaviour to change; (b) more accurate estimations of σ inn in a practical traitor tracing scheme; (c) efficiency of the interleaving defense at small c, i.e. the non-asymptotic regime whereμ C /σ inn is no longer the right performance indicator. In this regime the Worst Case Attack (that minimizes I (Y ; X| p)) should also be considered, as this is then no longer equal to the interleaving attack. (d) simulations using multiple suspicion functions in parallel; (e) iterative joint decoders employing the m-dependent suspicion functions.
